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A key area of policy concern is to what extent those approaching the state pension 
age (SPA) will have adequate resources in retirement. While the current rate of 
income poverty among the older population is lower than for other groups 
(particularly children), concerns over the adequacy of retirement income in Ireland 
are widespread. In this report, we use data from the Irish Longitudinal Study on 
Ageing (TILDA) to assess the extent to which a cohort of individuals born between 
1955 and 1960, who will reach the SPA of 67 over the period 2022–2027, will have 
an adequate level of income in retirement. We use information on their incomes, 
work history and wealth holdings, recorded at the first wave of TILDA data 
collection in 2010, to simulate forward these adults’ likely incomes in retirement, 
from both private and public sources. 
One commonly used measure of retirement income adequacy is the income 
replacement rate, defined as the ratio of post-retirement income (from pensions, 
annuitised wealth holdings, etc) to pre-retirement income. Replacement rate 
measures of retirement income adequacy have been to the forefront of 
government policy in Ireland in recent decades. In this report we assess the 
adequacy of retirement income using three replacement rate benchmarks: 
• <50 per cent of pre-retirement earnings; 
• <67 per cent of pre-retirement household disposable income; and 
• <80 per cent of pre-retirement household disposable income. 
An alternative approach assesses the adequacy of retirement income by 
determining whether it is sufficient to meet basic needs (i.e. having a high-enough 
income to be able to purchase necessities such as housing, food and clothing). This 
is assessed in terms of whether retirement resources are below some benchmark 
of income poverty. Three poverty-line benchmarks are assessed in this report:  
• <60 per cent of median household disposable income (the current at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold); 
• <50 per cent of median household disposable income; and 
• <the Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) calculated by the Vincentian 
Partnership for Social Justice (2019). 
We also consider successively broader definitions of what constitutes income in 
retirement, starting with a narrow definition that includes state and 
supplementary pension income only. The broad measure incorporates the 
annuitised value of net financial assets, while the broadest measure includes half 
the annuitised value of owner-occupied housing wealth. 
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Focusing first on the replacement rate measures, the analysis shows that, on the 
narrowest definition of income, just over a fifth of those approaching the SPA will 
replace less than half of their pre-retirement earnings (see Table 1). This falls to 
16.7 per cent when one includes the annuitised value of net financial assets 
(excluding primary residences) in the definition of income, and 12 per cent when 
half the annuitised value of primary residences is added. Assessing retirement 
income against pre-retirement household disposable income rather than pre-
retirement earnings shows instead that over half of those approaching the SPA will 
replace less than 67 per cent of their pre-retirement disposable income, while 
more than 6 in 10 will replace less than 80 per cent. Again, these shares fall 
substantially – to 41.9 per cent and 50.1 per cent respectively – when one includes 
the annuitised value of net financial assets, and further still – to 36.1 per cent and 
44.6 per cent – when half the annuitised value of primary residences is added. 
Those more at risk of having lower replacement rates in retirement include 
women, people with higher levels of education and those living alone. 
TABLE 1  REPLACEMENT RATE MEASURES OF INCOME ADEQUACY 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <50% earnings <67% income <80% income 
Measure of income in retirement:    
Narrow  0.230 0.545 0.633 
Plus annuitised value of net-financial assets  0.167 0.419 0.501 
Plus half annuitised value of primary residences  0.120 0.361 0.446 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Replacement rates calculated at an individual level comparing equivalised household disposable income in 
retirement to equivalised household gross earnings before retirement (column 1) and equivalised disposable income 
before retirement (columns 2 and 3). 
 
When retirement income is assessed against the current at-risk-of-poverty 
benchmark, 24.4 per cent of those approaching the SPA are likely to have 
inadequate income in retirement, using the narrowest definition of income (see 
Table 2). However, as with replacement rate measures of adequacy, this falls 
markedly when one includes the annuitised value of net financial assets and half 
the annuitised value of primary residences – to 9.2 and 5.4 per cent respectively. 
The share of individuals classified as having inadequate income is also far lower if 
we use an alternative benchmark that aligns with the OECD definition of the 
poverty rate. On this measure – having income below 50 per cent rather than 60 
per cent of the national median – only 7.1 per cent of individuals would have an 
inadequate level of retirement income using the narrowest definition and only 2.1 
per cent using the broadest definition. Finally, assessing retirement income against 
the MESL benchmark shows that 27.5 per cent of the cohort would fall below this 
benchmark using the narrowest definition of income. Again, this share falls 
substantially – to 16.8 per cent and 7.5 per cent – when one includes the annuitised 
value of net financial assets and half the annuitised value of primary residences 
respectively. In contrast to the replacement rate results, those with higher levels 
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of education are less likely to be assessed as having an inadequate income in 
retirement using the poverty-line benchmarks. However, those living alone emerge 
once again as a group with a higher probability of having inadequate retirement 
incomes.  
TABLE 2  POVERTY LINE MEASURES OF INCOME ADEQUACY 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <60% median <50% median <MESL 
Measure of income in retirement:    
Narrow 0.244 0.071 0.275 
Plus annuitised value of net-financial assets 0.092 0.030 0.168 
Plus half annuitised value of primary residences 0.054 0.021 0.075 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Median equivalised income for 60 and 50 per cent poverty lines taken from 2017 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions, uprated by forecast wage growth. MESL calculated by the Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2019) 
for pensioner households, uprated by forecast wage growth. 
 
A number of implications arise from this analysis. First, assessments of adequacy 
are very sensitive to the benchmark used. Even small changes in the benchmark 
can result in large changes in the proportion assessed as having inadequate 
resources in retirement. For example, moving from a poverty-line benchmark of 60 
per cent of median household disposable income (the current at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold) to a 50 per cent of median household disposable income benchmark 
(the OECD at-risk-of-poverty threshold) results in a sharp fall in those with 
inadequate levels of income in retirement (from 24.4 per cent to 7.1 per cent using 
the narrow definition of income). This suggests that policymakers should interpret 
any particular benchmark of income adequacy with caution, particularly those that 
relate income in retirement to the amount of pre-retirement income it replaces.  
Second, across all benchmarks, broadening the definition of income in retirement 
to include financial assets, and further still to include half the value of owner-
occupied housing wealth, substantially reduces the proportions of those who are 
considered at risk of having inadequate resources in retirement. While the issue of 
whether individuals should draw on wealth in the form of primary residences to 
support living standards in retirement is contentious, less so is that individuals 
should draw on other forms of wealth. Our results suggest that private non-
pension, non-primary residence savings play an important role in individuals’ 
preparedness for retirement. Although uncertainty over future health and long-
term costs, as well as the desire to leave bequests to children, may partly explain 
the reticence on the part of individuals to sell these assets to fund consumption in 
retirement, the design of capital taxes may also influence behaviour. Currently, 
assets transferred at death are fully exempt from Capital Gains Tax (CGT), which 
incentivises individuals to hold onto these assets rather than dispose of them in 
retirement. Any assessment of capital taxation should therefore consider the 
impacts of the design of these taxes on the behaviour of retirees. 
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Third, across all the benchmarks we consider, one group of people stands out as 
being at particular risk of having an inadequate income in retirement: those who 
are not married or cohabitating in the years before retirement. The Living Alone 
Increase, an additional payment made to recipients of both the contributory and 
non-contributory state pension and certain other social welfare payments) could 
therefore be a particularly well-targeted instrument for addressing concerns about 
income adequacy in retirement among those approaching the SPA.  
More generally, there is a need for more explicit discussion of the inherent trade-
offs involved in meeting benchmarks of income adequacy in retirement. Policy 
debates often consider more saving for retirement to be unambiguously a positive 
thing. In many cases it may well be. However, there is – all else being equal – a 
trade-off between living standards in retirement and in working life. For someone 
who has low levels of lifetime income, more saving for retirement comes at the 
expense of lower living standards during working life when needs might be high, 
particularly in the presence of children. While this trade-off can be relaxed by 
redistribution within or across cohorts, requiring individuals to save more for their 
retirement imposes costs during working life that should be taken into account in 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction  
A key area of policy concern is to what extent those approaching the state pension 
age (SPA) will have adequate resources in retirement. While the current rate of 
income poverty among the older (65+) population at 11.4 per cent is lower than 
for other population groups – particularly children under 18, at 15.9 per cent (CSO, 
2019a)1 – concerns over the adequacy of retirement income in Ireland are 
widespread (e.g. Government of Ireland, 2018; Mulligan et al., 2019). 2 
However, assessing the adequacy of income in retirement is complicated by the 
diversity of labour market histories, wealth holdings, future health status, and 
preferences regarding consumption in retirement across the population (Dudel 
and Schmied, 2019; Poterba, 2015). One commonly used measure of retirement 
income adequacy is the income replacement rate, defined as the ratio of post-
retirement income (from pensions, annuitised wealth holdings, etc) to pre-
retirement income (such as earnings during the years preceding retirement, or 
average earnings over the working life). The theoretical framework underpinning 
this approach is that individuals accumulate wealth during their working lives, and 
then draw down this asset wealth in order to smooth their consumption over their 
lifetime (Knoff et al., 2016).  
Such an approach underlies the setting of targets for retirement income adequacy 
in Ireland. For example, the most recent Pensions Roadmap 2018–2023 aims to 
ensure that the state pension, in combination with supplementary pensions, 
replaces a sufficient proportion (between 50 and 60 per cent)3 of an individual’s 
pre-retirement earnings so as to enable them to maintain a reasonable standard 
of living after retirement (Government of Ireland, 2018). Furthermore, the 
Government has indicated that it intends to index the maximum level of the 
contributory state pension to 34 per cent of average earnings, though it has yet to 
announce the formal mechanism that will ensure this target is met (ibid).  
To date, research in an Irish context has also focused on replacement rates in 
assessing the adequacy of retirement income (Bercholz et al., 2019; Nivakoski, 
 
1 Rates of material deprivation (8.2 per cent) and consistent poverty (1.7 per cent) among the older population 
are also considerably lower than among other age groups. For example, rates of material deprivation among 
children were 19.7 per cent in 2018, and the rate of consistent poverty was 7.7 per cent (CSO, 2019a). 
2 The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is generally defined as having an equivalised disposable income below 60 per cent 
of the median equivalised income for the population.  
3 Individuals may need less than their full pre-retirement income to maintain their level of consumption in 
retirement because they incur fewer work-related expenses, can devote more time to home production, 
generally pay less in taxes, no longer need to save for retirement, have fewer dependents, and are less likely to 
be servicing mortgage and other types of debt (Crawford and O’Dea, 2012; Dudel and Schmied, 2019; Munnell 
et al., 2015). On the other hand, uncertainty over future health and long-term care costs may necessitate a 
higher replacement rate. 
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2014; Nivakoski and Barrett, 2019). Using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study on 
Ageing (TILDA), Nivakoski (2014) and Nivakoski and Barrett (2019) found that 
income replacement rates were highest for women and those at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution, more reflecting the lower earnings of these groups 
immediately prior to retirement than high levels of resources available in 
retirement. Bercholz et al. (2019) calculated (contributory) state pension income 
replacement rates for those in the potential target group for auto-enrolment4 
(aged 23-60, earning over €20,000 per year and not contributing to a 
supplementary pension). Using Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) data, 
they found that, for those with incomes between €20,000 and €30,000, 93 per cent 
would have net replacement rates that, adjusted for mortgage costs, would be 
below 70 per cent.  
However, replacement rates are sensitive to how income (both pre- and post-
retirement) is defined, and generally do not take into account the wider resources 
of the household (e.g. from other family members and/or from assets), or future 
risks to longevity, investments and healthcare needs (Knoff et al., 2016). An 
extensive literature has demonstrated the sensitivity of income replacement rate 
calculations to assumptions about the unit of analysis, definition of income and 
future longevity, investment and health risks (Brady, 2010; Chen et al., 2018; Hurd 
and Rohwedder, 2012; Poterba, 2014; Purcell, 2012). The usefulness of a single 
replacement rate as a policy goal has also been questioned (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2017; Nivakoski and Barrett, 2019).  
An alternative approach assesses the adequacy of retirement income by 
determining whether it is sufficient to meet basic needs (i.e. having enough income 
to be able to purchase necessities such as housing, food and clothing). This is 
assessed in terms of whether retirement resources are below some benchmark of 
income poverty, typically the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. A combination of 
indicators is recommended when assessing retirement income adequacy as a high 
replacement rate may not necessarily reflect a high level of income in retirement, 
and an income level just above a poverty threshold does not necessarily imply a 
high replacement rate (Banks et al., 2012; Congressional Budget Office, 2017; Knoff 
et al., 2016).  
In this context, a number of studies have attempted to move beyond a single 
replacement rate to consider multiple indicators of retirement income adequacy, 
varying not only the definition of income, but also the benchmarks used to assess 
adequacy. A series of studies in England, using data from the English Longitudinal 
 
4 Auto-enrolment (the Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings System) is due to be introduced in 2022. Under 
auto-enrolment, employees without personal retirement savings and who meet certain age and earnings criteria 
will be automatically enrolled into a state-sponsored quality-assured supplementary retirement savings system, 
with freedom of choice to opt out. See: https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/1816502908-automatic-
enrolment-retirement-savings-system/  
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Study on Ageing (ELSA), illustrate the benefits of this approach. Banks et al. (2005) 
used data on nearly 5,000 individuals aged between 50 and the SPA from the 
2002/2003 ELSA to calculate the fraction of the sample whose retirement 
resources were below different benchmarks for adequate retirement resources. 
Two broad indicators of retirement income adequacy were constructed, one based 
on a poverty line defined by the pension credit guarantee (a level below which the 
benefit system will not allow incomes to fall), and a second based on income 
replacement rates. They found that only 7 per cent of the over-50s fell below the 
poverty line, that 11 per cent had less than a two-thirds replacement rate, and that 
23 per cent had less than an 80 per cent replacement rate. Multivariate analysis 
showed that individuals who had high current income (for example, those in paid 
work) were more likely to be at risk of having low replacement rates in retirement. 
In contrast, it was the lifetime-poor (those with low levels of education, those in 
poor health and those out of work who did not consider themselves retired) who 
were most at risk of having retirement incomes below the pension credit 
guarantee, even if their retirement income was predicted to be high relative to 
their current income. Further analysis of those at risk of inadequate resources in 
retirement, using the same data, analysed the distribution of those at risk across 
income groups and employment status, and assessed the sensitivity of the 
estimates to differing definitions of retirement resources. They found, for example, 
that 9.2 per cent of those in the lowest earnings band (<£8,000 in 2002/2003) 
would fall below the UK Pensions Commission ‘at risk’ benchmark on the basis of 
pension wealth, rising to 46.8 per cent among those in the highest earnings band 
(>£26,000).5 Using the most comprehensive definition of wealth (i.e. incorporating 
owner-occupied housing, expected inheritances and pension credit) reduced these 
proportions to 0.3 per cent and 19.9 per cent respectively (Emmerson and Tetlow, 
2006).  
Crawford and O’Dea (2012) updated these analyses using later waves of the ELSA 
(covering the period 2004 to 2010) to provide a new assessment of the proportion 
of people aged between 50 and the SPA who were at risk of having inadequate 
resources in retirement. Their main analysis covered over 2,500 individuals 
surveyed in 2008/2009. They considered six definitions of what constitutes income 
in retirement, ranging from pension income (private and state), to the broadest 
measure of income that included pension income, the annuitised value of non-
housing wealth, expected inheritances, means-tested pension credit and imputed 
rental income from owner-occupied housing wealth. Four benchmarks of pension 
income adequacy were considered; a poverty line (i.e. the pension credit 
guaranteed level of income), and three income replacement rates (67 per cent of 
net family income, 80 per cent and a threshold that varied with pre-retirement 
gross earnings). They found that 12 per cent of individuals would have an income 
 
5 Adequacy was assessed against the 2004 UK Pensions Commission benchmark, which varied the income 
replacement rate with earnings (from 80 per cent for those earning less than £8,000 to 50 per cent for those 
earning £40,000 or more).  
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at the SPA of less than the pension credit guarantee, using a definition of income 
that included only state and private pension income. Using the same definition of 
income, 41 per cent of individuals would replace less than 67 per cent of their 
current net family income, while 53 per cent would replace less than 80 per cent. 
Redefining income to incorporate the broadest definition reduced these 
proportions considerably; for example, the proportion of individuals at risk of 
replacing less than 67 per cent of their current income fell to 10 per cent. 
Multivariate regression analysis of the factors associated with the median income 
replacement rate showed that, while the higher-educated had significantly lower 
income replacement rates using the basic definition of income, this difference was 
no longer statistically significant when using the more comprehensive definition of 
income that incorporated financial and housing wealth. Comparisons between 
2004/2005 and 2009/2010 showed that the proportion of individuals at risk of 
inadequate resources in retirement had fallen.6  
This paper takes a similar approach to Banks et al. (2005) and Crawford and O’Dea 
(2012) for Ireland. We examine both replacement rate and poverty-line 
benchmarks of income adequacy for a birth cohort who will reach the (current) 
state pension age of 67 between 2022 and 2027. Born between 1955 and 1960, 
these are the youngest adults surveyed by the first wave of TILDA, which included 
detailed questions on individuals’ asset holdings and employment histories. We 
use this information to simulate forward these adults’ likely incomes in retirement, 
from both private and public sources. The individual is the unit of analysis, but 
where individuals are part of a couple, we take into account the income of the 
partner to calculate household equivalised income. 
The remainder of this report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 briefly outlines the 
current public and private pension system in Ireland. Chapter 3 summarises the 
data we use and our methodological approach, with more detailed technical 
documentation found in Appendix 1. Chapter 4 presents the results of our analysis, 
and their implications for policy are discussed in Chapter 5, which also concludes.  
  
 
6 However, non-random attrition from ELSA over time means that this result should be treated with caution. 




Irish Pension System 
Before introducing the data and methods, we briefly describe the current Irish 
pension system, given its importance to incomes in retirement. Data from the Irish 
Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) for 2011 show that just over 80 per 
cent of the gross income of the population aged 65+ comprises income from the 
three main pillars of the pension system: state, occupational and private pensions 
(CSO, 2013).  
The first of these pillars is the most extensive. The latest official figures show that 
only 56.3 per cent of those aged 20 to 69 in employment in 2018 were covered by 
an occupational or private pension (CSO, 2019b). This first pillar comprises the 
state (contributory or non-contributory) pension, which is a largely flat-rate 
payment (i.e. not earnings-related), payable from age 66. Entitlement to the state 
pension (contributory) is based on a complex set of rules, and depends on when 
the individual first entered employment, the number of pay-related social 
insurance (PRSI) contributions, and the average number of contributions per year.7 
To qualify for the non-contributory state welfare pension, a person must pass a 
means test based on both income and wealth, and must be habitually resident in 
Ireland (Nivakoski and Barrett, 2019).8  
The SPA in Ireland is currently 66, with no provision to defer any entitlement or to 
claim it earlier. Prior to 2014, the state pension (transition) in Ireland was payable 
at age 65 to individuals who retired from insurable employment and satisfied 
certain social insurance contribution conditions. The state pension (transition) was 
abolished in 2014. For both the contributory and non-contributory state pensions, 
the SPA will further increase to 67 in 2021 and to 68 in 2028 (Government of 
Ireland, 2018). In 2018 in Ireland, the effective retirement age9 for men was 65.6, 
and 64.1 for women (OECD, 2019). 
The second pillar comprises occupational pensions, which cover a broad section of 
 
7 It is proposed to move to a new ‘total contributions approach’ (TCA) for determining the level of contributory 
pension received by an individual. Under this system, the amount of pensions will be directly proportionate to 
the number of social insurance contributions made by a person over his or her working life, rather than the 
average (Government of Ireland, 2018). While this was initially intended to be fully rolled out for those retiring 
in 2020 onwards, those reaching the SPA are currently being assessed under the existing and TCA systems and 
given an entitlement corresponding to the higher of the two.    
8 The maximum contributory state pension payable in 2010, when wave 1 of the TILDA dataset was collected, 
was €230.30 per week, corresponding to 33.1 per cent of average earnings (using the CSO Earnings and Labour 
Costs measure of average earnings). The non-contributory state pension is means-tested and was capped at a 
pre-tax rate of €219 per week in 2010 (Nolan et al., 2019). 
9 The effective retirement age is the average age of labour market exit. It is generally lower than the state 
pension age (SPA) (OECD, 2019). 
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the population.10 Tax relief at the marginal rate is available for contributions to 
approved occupational pension schemes. It is generally not possible to contribute 
to an occupational pension scheme after the normal age of retirement. There is no 
legal obligation for employers to provide occupational pension schemes, but those 
who do not must provide access to at least one Personal Retirement Savings 
Account (PRSA). However, public service occupational pension schemes are in 
place for staff across the civil service, local authorities, Garda Síochána (Irish 
police), the Defence Forces, the health and education sectors and non-commercial 
state bodies. Along with New Zealand, Ireland is the only OECD country without 
mandatory earnings-related pension provision (OECD, 2014), although recent 
reforms in the UK abolished such provision since 2016 (Crawford et al., 2013).  
Finally, the third pillar is a voluntary savings pillar, typically comprised of long-term 
personal savings and financial investments used to fund retirement over and above 
first and second-pillar arrangements. Private pension schemes are voluntary and 
include Retirement Annuity Contracts (RACs), commonly used by the self-
employed, and PRSAs, which were introduced in 2002 as an attempt to increase 




10 Of those covered by an occupational or personal pension in 2018, 63.7 per cent had an occupational pension 
only, 16 per cent a personal pension only, and 20.3 per cent had both (CSO, 2019b). 




Summary of Data and Methods 
In this paper, we use data from the Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA). 
TILDA is a nationally representative survey of community-dwelling individuals aged 
50 years and over, and their spouses or partners of any age (i.e. individuals living 
in nursing homes or other institutions were excluded at baseline). The study is 
harmonised with other international longitudinal studies of ageing, such as the US 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe (SHARE) and the English Longitudinal Study on Ageing (ELSA). The dataset 
contains a rich set of variables on the demographic, health and socio-economic 
circumstances of older people in Ireland. Data are collected primarily via 
computer-aided personal interviewing (CAPI). Data collection for the first wave 
took place over the period October 2009 to February 2011, when 8,504 individuals 
were sampled, of whom 8,175 were aged 50+ years (Barrett et al., 2011).11 Further 
information on the sample design is available elsewhere (Whelan and Savva, 2013).  
We use data from wave 1 in this paper, focusing on the sample of those who were 
born between 1955 and 1960, i.e. those aged between 50 and 55 at TILDA wave 1. 
These individuals have a state pension age (SPA) of 67, with an expected date of 
receipt ranging from 2022 to 2027. A number of these individuals reported being 
retired at the time of the 2010 TILDA survey (n=58). We drop them from our 
sample, as we cannot observe their incomes before retirement and so cannot 
calculate replacement rates for them, leaving a final sample size of 1,904. 
The main outcome of interest in this paper is household-level income at the point 
of retirement, assumed to be age 67, the SPA. We analyse predicted values of this 
variable for our cohort of interest, the first of whom will retire in 2022. Therefore, 
our goal is to use the information provided in the TILDA questionnaire to predict 
the future income in retirement of participants in our cohort of interest. The TILDA 
survey provides the requisite information to predict future incomes in retirement. 
The survey collects data on participants’ earnings, current employment status, 
employment history and asset holdings, alongside comprehensive information on 
the details of their occupational and personal pension schemes. Information on 
demographics, family circumstances and other related factors is also provided, 
which can be combined with income and asset information to generate predictions 
of future retirement income.  
Our approach follows that of O’Dea and Crawford (2012) in attempting to examine 
the adequacy of incomes in retirement for individuals approaching the SPA over 
 
11 The second wave of TILDA was carried out between April 2012 and March 2013, wave 3 between March 2014 
and October 2015, and wave 4 between January 2016 and December 2016, with response rates ranging from 84 
to 88 per cent (Donoghue et al., 2018). Data from waves 5 (2018) and waves 6 (2020) will soon be available. 
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the period 2022–2027. Following their approach, we assess retirement income 
adequacy for our cohort against a variety of benchmarks of adequacy, relating 
income in retirement both to that immediately before retirement and to some 
minimum level of resources considered adequate to buy essential goods and 
services.12 
In both cases, decisions over what constitutes ‘income’ in retirement also need to 
be considered; e.g. should the imputed income from owner-occupied housing 
wealth be considered as a source of income for retirement? Here, we consider 
three definitions of income, which differ in their treatment of assets accumulated 
before retirement. Our first definition of income, which we refer to as narrow 
income, is income derived from the public and private pensions of household 
members, and market income of spouses who are still in work, less applicable 
income taxes. The second adds asset income, while the third adds half the value of 
imputed income from owner-occupied housing wealth. This reflects the fact that a 
couple or single adult with housing wealth is, all else being equal, better off than 
one without. Housing wealth may be converted into income, and/or those with 
owner-occupied housing wealth do not have to pay rent. Where the individual is a 
member of a couple, incomes of both partners are considered and total household 
income is adjusted for household size. 13 
The technical appendix contains full details on the data sources, assumptions and 
methods used to calculate income under each of these three definitions, both pre- 
and post-retirement, for our cohort.  However, at this point it is worth noting two 
key assumptions that underlie our analysis.  
First, individuals are assumed to retire when they reach the SPA of 67. While Banks 
et al. (2005) assumed that individuals retire according to their recorded 
expectations of working past a certain age in the ELSA, it is likely that such 
expectations themselves depend on expectations of available income in 
retirement, with those who are inadequately prepared choosing to delay 
retirement. Moreover, calculating predicted retirement income when each 
individual reaches the SPA provides a consistent measure of the distribution of 
future resources that is not affected by changes to family circumstances, future 
health status, preferences for working life, etc.  
Second, we assume the circumstances and behaviours recorded by our cohort in 
2010 (when individuals in the cohort were aged between 50 and 55) remain 
 
12 As described in Appendix 1, our measure of disposable income before retirement is taken from the single 
comprehensive income question in TILDA, which O’Sullivan et al. (2014) show significantly understates average 
disposable income relative to SILC. This means that the replacement rate measures of income adequacy we 
examine later may be overstated, and so the levels of income inadequacy on this measure may be understated.     
13 We use the national (CSO) equivalence scale, which gives the first adult in a household a weight of 1, 
subsequent adults aged 14+ a weight of 0.66 and any children a weight of 0.33. 
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constant until the individual reaches the SPA. Importantly, we assume employment 
and welfare status remains constant from the point of the survey until the SPA, 
that earnings rise in line with forecast wage growth, and that those who have 
supplementary defined contribution (DC) pensions continue to make contributions 
until they reach retirement. Given that earnings follow a distinct age profile, 
peaking for both men and women around age 50 (CSO, 2019c), this suggests that 
we are examining replacement rate measures of income adequacy relative to quite 
a demanding benchmark (final or near-final earnings). For example, Crawford and 
O’Dea (2020) find that, while almost 90 per cent of those born in England in the 
1940s will replace less than 70 per cent of their pre-retirement earnings in 
retirement, only a third will replace less than this fraction of their average working 
life earnings. The authors argue, convincingly, that replacement rates out of 
lifetime income may be a more relevant concept when considering the adequacy 
of income in retirement. However, due to data limitations we are restricted to 
examining income prior to retirement measured at a single point in time.  
Figure 3.1 shows the simulated distribution of disposable income in retirement 
adjusted (equivalised) for family size on each of our three definitions of income. 
With the narrowest of these definitions, there is a large spike at around €16,000 
per year. This is somewhat above the annualised level of the maximum state 
pension we simulate will be in place by 2022, and reflects the fact that the state 
pension comprises the main source of income in retirement for most of this cohort, 
with few entitled to substantial private and occupational pension income.   
FIGURE 3.1 SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT INCOME, BY DEFINITION OF INCOME 
  
Sources: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: The figure shows the distribution of equivalised disposable income using the modified OECD scales under each of 
our three definitions of income. ‘Narrow’ includes just state, occupational and private pension income. ‘Broad’ adds 
to this the annuitised value of net-financial assets excluding primary residences. ‘Broadest’ adds to this half the 
annuitised value of primary residences.    
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TABLE 3.1 SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT INCOME, BY DEFINITION OF INCOME 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Summary Statistics Narrow Broad Broadest 
Mean €18,615 €30,163 €33,468 
10th percentile  €12,756 €15,053 €15,533 
25th percentile  €15,053 €15,672 €17,636 
50th percentile (median) €15,685 €18,079 €22,156 
75th percentile  €18,533 €30,139 €34,557 
90th percentile  €28,722 €55,008 €59,967 
    
Gini coefficient 0.203 0.395 0.382 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Summary statistics for distribution of equivalised disposable income using the modified OECD scales under each of 
our three definitions of income. ‘Narrow’ includes just state, occupational and private pension income. ‘Broad’ adds 
to this the annuitised value of net-financial assets excluding primary residences. ‘Broadest’ adds to this half the 
annuitised value of primary residences.    
 
 
However, expanding the definition of income to include the annuitised value of 
net-financial assets (the ‘broad’ series) changes the shape of the distribution 
significantly. As shown in Table 3.1, it raises median equivalised disposable income 
from €15,685 to €18,079, with much bigger increases higher up the distribution. 
Indeed, Table 3.1 also shows that widening the definition of income increases the 
mean value from €18,615 to €30,163, but the 90th percentile from €28,722 to 
€55,008. Similarly, widening the definition further to include half the annuitised 
value of primary residences results in a much more dispersed distribution of 
income, with a median value of €22,156 and a mean of €33,468.  
This greater dispersion of income is also reflected in the much larger Gini 
coefficients – a summary measure of inequality ranging from 0 (where everyone 
has the same income) to 1 (where one person has all the income) – for more 
broadly defined measures of income: 0.203, 0.395 and 0.382 for the narrow, broad 
and broadest measures of income respectively. The following chapter builds on 
this analysis to assess the adequacy of these simulated retirement incomes against 
various benchmarks. 
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CHAPTER 4  
Results 
Assessing the adequacy of incomes in retirement is not a straightforward task. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a number of assumptions are required to simulate what 
this income is likely to be, while there are multiple definitions of what one may 
want to consider as income. However, even if the income a family will have in 
retirement could be known with certainty, further assumptions are needed to 
make any claims about its adequacy. Two broad approaches have emerged in the 
literature and policy discussions. The first considers adequacy with reference to an 
individual’s previous levels of income: a replacement rate approach. The second 
considers adequacy with reference to some fixed level of income deemed 
sufficient to buy essential goods and services: a poverty-line approach.  
Neither approach provides a definitive answer to whether those approaching the 
state pension age (SPA) will have an adequate income in retirement, while both 
embed certain – ultimately subjective – assumptions about what should be 
deemed an ‘adequate’ income in retirement. We therefore consider a range of 
measures under both approaches in this chapter, discussing some of the 
underlying assumptions and shortcomings of each.14 Taken together, these can 
further our understanding of which groups may be at risk of having insufficient 
resources to provide for their needs in retirement. 
4.1 REPLACEMENT RATE MEASURES 
We first consider replacement rate measures of income adequacy. These conceive 
of adequacy as related to an individual’s income during their working life, with 
those replacing less than a certain proportion of their pre-retirement income in 
retirement deemed to have inadequate income. Such measures are theoretically 
grounded in a long-standing economics literature that emphasises the desire of 
individuals to smooth the profile of consumption over their lifecycles, avoiding 
significant volatility where possible.15 In addition, they have the attractive feature 
of being relatively simple to calculate and intuitive to understand. 
However, these measures have a number of shortcomings. First, the pre-
retirement income that constitutes the denominator is measured at a particular 
snapshot in time, so may not give a fair reflection of living standards in working life 
if incomes are particularly volatile or subject to substantial measurement error. 
This may lead to the degree of income adequacy being over- or understated, 
depending on the nature of the volatility and measurement error.  
 
14 For a good discussion of these issues, see also pp.14-19 of Crawford and O’Dea (2012). 
15 Browning and Crossley (2001) provide a summary of this literature and the empirical evidence to support it.  
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Second, the potential mismeasurement of working-life living standards may be 
exacerbated if older adults ‘phase’ into retirement, reducing their hours of work or 
work intensity as they approach the SPA. This could lead us to overstate the 
adequacy of incomes in retirement by understating the level of incomes during 
working life. Third, and more substantively, it is not clear that the same level of 
income in retirement is needed to obtain a given standard of living in working life. 
Retirees do not face many costs associated with work – for example, commuting 
costs – and have more leisure time, some of which can be used to achieve desired 
consumption at a lower cost; for example, shopping around for lower-cost 
groceries or cooking from scratch rather than eating prepared meals (Aguiar and 
Hurst, 2005). They also do not have to save for retirement, having at that stage 
retired. On the other hand, retirement may be associated with greater health and 
social care costs than in working life. All this suggests that comparisons to income 
in working life do not provide an unambiguously clear indication of the adequacy 
of income in retirement.    
Nevertheless, replacement rate measures of income adequacy have been to the 
forefront of pension policy debates in Ireland over recent decades. Since it was 
recommended in the National Pensions Policy Initiative (National Pensions Board, 
1998), successive governments have formally adopted, endorsed or referenced an 
income adequacy benchmark based on replacing 50 per cent of gross pre-
retirement earnings in retirement.16  
The first column in Table 4.1 shows the proportion of individuals who replace less 
than 50 per cent of their gross pre-retirement earnings (𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤) in retirement for each 
of the three income measures described in Chapter 3; that is, the share for whom 
𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟
𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤
< 0.5 where 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟  is disposable income in retirement using successively broader 
definitions of income (𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚1𝑟𝑟 , 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚2𝑟𝑟 , 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚3𝑟𝑟 ).  
On the narrowest definition of income (𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚1𝑟𝑟 ), just over a fifth of those approaching 
the SPA replace less than half of their pre-retirement earnings. This falls to 16.7 per 
cent when one includes the annuitised value of net-financial assets (excluding 
primary residences, 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚2𝑟𝑟 ) in the definition of income, and 12 per cent when half the 
annuitised value of primary residences is added to this (𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚3𝑟𝑟 ). 
 
16 See Rec. 9 S.5.1.7 in National Pensions Board (1998), reaffirmed by National Pensions Board (2006) and the 
Green Paper on Pensions (Government of Ireland, 2007). While the more recent Roadmap for Pensions Reform 
(Government of Ireland, 2018) does not set a formal target of income adequacy, it does cite 50-60% as ‘a 
sufficient proportion … of an individual’s pre-retirement earnings so as to enable the individual concerned to 
maintain a reasonable standard of living after retirement’. 
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TABLE 4.1  REPLACEMENT RATE MEASURES OF INCOME ADEQUACY 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <50% earnings <67% income <80% income 
Measure of income in retirement:    
Narrow (𝒀𝒀𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒓𝒓 ) 0.230 0.545 0.633 
Plus annuitised value of net-financial assets (𝒀𝒀𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒓𝒓 ) 0.167 0.419 0.501 
Plus half annuitised value of primary residences (𝒀𝒀𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒓𝒓 ) 0.120 0.361 0.446 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Replacement rates calculated at an individual level comparing equivalised household disposable income in 
retirement to equivalised household gross earnings before retirement (column 1) and equivalised disposable income 
before retirement (columns 2 and 3). 
 
 
While comparing income from all sources in retirement to just earnings from 
employment (and self-employment) during working life is common, Nivakoski and 
Barrett (2019) show that it can yield potentially misleading results. This is not least 
because the measure is defined only for those with positive pre-retirement 
earnings, excluding from consideration those without any earnings. They show that 
comparisons of more comprehensive measures of pre- and post-retirement 
income – including not just earnings but income from social welfare benefits and 
other sources – give lower replacement rates at the top and the bottom of the 
distribution. Such measures are also arguably more reflective of the resources 
available before retirement and thus of how adequately those approaching the SPA 
will be able to replicate those standards of living in retirement (with the caveats 
discussed above). 
Table 4.1 shows the share of individuals whose disposable income in retirement  is 
less than 67 per cent (col. 2) and 80 per cent (col. 3) of their pre-retirement 
household disposable income (𝑌𝑌𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊). These benchmarks have been used elsewhere 
(e.g. Crawford and O’Dea, 2012) and suggest a far larger proportion of individuals 
are at risk of having an inadequate income in retirement than the earnings-related 
benchmark does. Indeed, our simulations project that, on the narrowest definition 
of income in retirement, over half of those approaching the SPA will replace less 
than 67 per cent of their pre-retirement disposable income while more than 6 in 
10 will replace less than 80 per cent. However, these shares fall substantially – to 
41.9 per cent and 50.1 per cent respectively – when one includes the annuitised 
value of net-financial assets, and further still – to 36.1 per cent and 44.6 per cent – 
when half the annuitised value of primary residences is added. 
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FIGURE 4.1  CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF REPLACEMENT RATES, BY INCOME MEASURE 
  
Sources: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Replacement rates calculated at an individual level comparing equivalised household disposable income in 
retirement to equivalised household disposable income before retirement. 
 
 
The share of individuals classified as being at risk of having inadequate income is 
also quite sensitive to the level at which the adequacy benchmark is defined. Figure 
4.1 plots the cumulative distribution of household income replacement rates for 
each measure of disposable income. The steepness of the lines between 0.5 and 
0.75 on the horizontal axis show that a large number of individuals replace around 
two-thirds of pre-retirement disposable income in retirement.17 As a result, the 
precise replacement rate cut-off used for the adequacy benchmark can lead to 
quite different shares of individuals deemed to be at risk of having an inadequate 
income in retirement. For example, setting this at half of pre-retirement disposable 
income reduces the proportion classified as at risk of having inadequate income in 
retirement to less than 40 per cent, using the narrow definition of income, down 
from 54.5 per cent when set at two-thirds.  
We now turn to look at which groups of individuals are at greater risk of having an 
inadequate income in retirement on the basis of these replacement rate 
benchmarks. Table 4.2 displays the odds ratios from logistic regressions of 
individual characteristics on the probability of having (narrowly defined) 
disposable income in retirement below each of the three adequacy benchmarks.18 
These coefficients are best explained with an example. An odds ratio of 2 says that 
an individual in group A faces twice the chance of someone in the excluded group 
 
17 Note that Figure 4.1 plots replacement rates using pre-retirement household disposable income as the 
denominator while the first column of Table 4.1 uses pre-retirement earnings as the denominator. 
18 Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendix present similar models for the ‘broad’ (including annuitised value of 
net financial assets) and ‘broadest’ (including also half the annuitised value of primary residence) definitions of 
post-retirement income respectively. 
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B of having an inadequate income in retirement.19 The key information to take 
from Table 4.2 is whether the coefficient is above or below 1, indicating that an 
individual with a certain characteristic (e.g. a woman) has respectively a greater or 
lower chance of having inadequate income in retirement than a similar individual 
in the excluded category (in this example, a man). 
TABLE 4.2  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF REPLACEMENT RATE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <50% earnings <67% income <80% income 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 0.713 0.642** 0.728* 
Rural area 0.644* 0.725* 0.824 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 0.614 0.823 0.958 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 12.913*** 5.472*** 3.977*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 0.525*** 0.587*** 0.597*** 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 1.890 1.349 1.394* 
Upper secondary 3.753*** 1.725** 1.641** 
Post-secondary < degree 3.704*** 1.895*** 1.973*** 
Post-secondary degree or higher 11.136*** 3.292*** 3.319*** 
    
Observations 1392 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions. Stars show statistical significance, indicating a p value of < 
0.05 (*),< 0.01(**) and < 0.001 (***) respectively. Replacement rates are calculated at an individual level comparing 
equivalised household disposable income in retirement (narrowly defined) to equivalised household earnings before 
retirement, excluding 512 individuals without any earnings (column 1) and equivalised disposable income before 
retirement (columns 2 and 3). 
 
 
The first set of coefficients shows that there is no statistically significant difference 
 
19 These allow us to easily compare the relative chance that someone in each group has of having inadequate 
income in retirement (which is constant across other covariates), but do not allow the absolute or relative risk 
of income adequacy to be directly inferred (as these depend on the values taken by other covariates). 
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between those living in Dublin and living outside of Dublin in the probability of 
replacing a small share of their earnings in retirement (col. 1), less than 67 per cent 
of their disposable income in retirement (col. 2) and less than 80 per cent of this 
income (col. 3).  
Similarly, while the next set of estimates shows that being part of a farming 
household increases the odds of someone having income below the adequacy 
benchmarks, none of these is statistically significant. However, as Table A2.1 in the 
Appendix shows, when the annuitised value of net-financial assets is included in 
the definition of income, those in farming households are significantly less likely to 
replace a small share of their pre-retirement earnings or disposable income. 
One characteristic that stands out as having an extremely strong association with 
being at risk of having an inadequate income in retirement is someone’s 
cohabitation status when we observe them in the first wave of TILDA. The 
estimates suggest that singles are far more likely than those married or 
cohabitating to replace less than half their earnings in retirement or to replace less 
than 67 per cent or 80 per cent of their working-life income. All estimates are 
statistically significant at even the 99.9 per cent level of confidence. 
While not as large in magnitude, the estimates also show that women have a much 
smaller chance than men of having an inadequate income in retirement on the 
basis of the three replacement rate measures. Similarly, the estimates suggest that 
those with more than upper secondary education (e.g. the Leaving Certificate) are 
more likely to replace a small share of their earnings or disposable income in 
retirement, with all estimates statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level of 
confidence. 
These last results may appear somewhat counter-intuitive, but illustrate an 
important feature of the Irish pension system that affects replacement rate 
measures of adequacy. They arise because both men and more highly educated 
adults are more likely to have higher earnings/income during working life and – 
given that the contributory state pension depends only on the number of years 
worked, not earnings – to replace a lower share of these earnings in retirement. 
Indeed, Nivakoski and Barrett (2019) show that those with low levels of earnings 
in working life have higher replacement rates than those with middle or even high 
levels of earnings. Caution is therefore required in the use of replacement rate 
measures of income adequacy in isolation. For that reason, we now also examine 
poverty-line measures of income adequacy.  
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4.2 POVERTY-LINE MEASURES 
Poverty-line measures conceive of income adequacy as related to a minimum of 
resources needed to buy essential goods and services. This raises the obvious 
question of what should be considered an essential good or service, answers to 
which are ultimately subjective and evolve over time. We examine three 
definitions that form part of policy discussions both in Ireland and abroad.  
The first classifies those with income (adjusted for household size) below 60 per 
cent of the national median to have inadequate income. This headcount measure 
aligns with the official at-risk-of-poverty rate published annually by the CSO. Table 
4.3 shows that, on this basis and using the narrowest definition of income, 24.4 per 
cent of those approaching the SPA are likely to have inadequate income in 
retirement, double the published at-risk-of-poverty rate for retired individuals in 
2018.20 However, as with replacement rate measures of adequacy, when one 
includes the annuitised value of net-financial assets and half the annuitised value 
of primary residences, this rate falls markedly – to 9.2 and 5.4 per cent respectively. 
The share of individuals classified as having inadequate income also falls 
dramatically if we use an alternative benchmark that aligns with the OECD 
definition of the poverty rate. On this measure – having income below 50 per cent 
rather than 60 per cent of the national median – only about a third as many 
individuals are classified as having inadequate income using the narrowest 
definition of income: 7.1 compared to 24.4 per cent. Including the annuitised value 
of net-financial assets in income reduces this further still (to 3 per cent), and the 
proportion falls to just over 2 per cent when half the annuitised value of primary 
residences is included. These are substantial differences that are important to 
understand in any assessment of income adequacy in retirement.  
 
TABLE 4.3  POVERTY LINE MEASURES OF INCOME ADEQUACY 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <60% median <50% median <MESL 
Measure of income in retirement:    
Narrow 0.244 0.071 0.275 
Plus annuitised value of net-financial assets 0.092 0.030 0.168 
Plus half annuitised value of primary residences 0.054 0.021 0.075 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Median equivalised income for 60 and 50 per cent poverty lines taken from 2017 Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions, uprated by forecast wage growth. MESL (Minimum Essential Standard of Living) is calculated by the 
Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2019) for pensioner households, uprated by forecast wage growth. 
 
20 In 2018, the at-risk-of-poverty rate (defined as below 60 per cent of median equivalised household income) 
was 13.7 per cent for those aged 18-64 and 11.4 per cent for those aged 65+ (CSO, 2019a). 
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FIGURE 4.2 SHARE OF INDIVIDUALS BELOW POVERTY LINE, BY DEFINITION OF POVERTY LINE 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Median income for 60 and 50 per cent poverty lines taken from 2017 Survey of Income and Living Conditions, 
uprated by forecast wage growth. 
 
Figure 4.2 plots the proportion of individuals classified as having inadequate 
income against the proportion of national median income that the poverty line is 
drawn at. It shows that the dramatic difference in the share of people classified as 
being at risk of poverty using the 60 and 50 per cent benchmarks arises because 
our simulations suggest a large number of individuals can expect to have incomes 
in retirement that are in-and-around 60 per cent of the national median. This 
income level corresponds to being in receipt of a near-full contributory state 
pension in addition to having a small amount of private savings. The figure 
illustrates one of the major drawbacks of poverty-line-based measures of income 
adequacy: that they can be very sensitive to minor definitional differences, 
especially when a large number of individuals have similar levels of income.  
Poverty-line thresholds like those above have also been criticised for linking the 
minimum resources needed to buy essential goods and services to a measure of 
median incomes (e.g. Sen, 1976; Atkinson, 1987; Callan and Nolan, 1991). This 
defines what an essential good or service is relative to what the median – or middle 
– household can afford to purchase.  
An alternative approach is to subjectively define what should be considered 
essential goods or services, and calculate the income required to purchase that 
consumption bundle. This approach has been adopted by the Vincentian 
Partnership for Social Justice (2019) to calculate what it calls a Minimum Essential 
Standard of Living (MESL) that differs by age, geographic region of residence and 
household size (shown in Table 4.4).   
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TABLE 4.4  WEEKLY ‘MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STANDARD OF LIVING’ THRESHOLDS, 2019 
 Urban Rural 
Pensioner living alone €250.05 €314.02 
Pensioner couple €315.38 €387.46 
 
Source: Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2019). 
 
 
The third column in Table 4.3 shows the proportion of individuals approaching the 
SPA that we simulate will have incomes below the relevant MESL threshold in 
retirement. With the narrowest definition of income, this stands at 27.5 per cent, 
a little higher than that classified as having inadequate income by the 60 per cent 
of median income benchmark. As with the other measures of adequacy, this falls 
substantially as the definition of income is broadened: to 16.8 per cent including 
the annuitised value of net-financial assets, and to 7.5 per cent after adding half 
the annuitised value of primary residences.  
Table 4.5 presents our analysis of the characteristics associated with having 
inadequate income in retirement using these ‘poverty line’ benchmarks of 
adequacy.21 Whereas those living in rural areas were less likely to be classified as 
having inadequate income using replacement rate benchmarks, they are far more 
likely to be using poverty-line benchmarks. These estimates are statistically 
significant at the 99.9 per cent confidence level for the 60 per cent of median 
income and MESL benchmark, though not for the 50 per cent of median income 
benchmark (likely a function of the small number of individuals classified as having 
inadequate income under this benchmark).  
The association is particularly strong for the MESL benchmark: the chances of being 
classified as having inadequate income are 16.7 times higher for people living in 
rural areas compared to those living in Dublin. Similarly, whereas farming 
households, women and less-educated individuals were all less likely to be at risk 
of having inadequate income using replacement rate benchmarks, they are more 
likely to be using poverty-line benchmarks (though none of these estimates is 
strongly statistically significant). This again reflects the fact that such individuals 
tend to have lower earnings and income in working life, but – given the same work 
history as a higher earner – receive the same level of contributory state pension. 
As a result, many replace a large proportion of their working-life income while 




21 Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in the Appendix present similar models for the ‘broad’ and ‘broadest’ definitions of 
post-retirement income respectively. 
20 | Income Adequacy in Retirement  
 
TABLE 4.5  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF POVERTY-LINE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: < 60% median < 50% median < MESL 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 1.091 0.833 0.809 
Rural area 1.480** 1.214 16.723*** 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 1.365 0.941 1.047 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 1.387** 0.755 34.831*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 1.252* 1.331 1.123 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 1.146 1.324 1.722* 
Upper secondary 0.928 1.071 1.776* 
Post-secondary < degree 0.736 0.804 1.260 
Post-secondary degree or higher 0.686 0.982 1.158 
    
Observations 1904 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions. Stars show statistical significance, indicating a p value of < 
0.05 (*),< 0.01(**) and < 0.001 (***) respectively. 
 
However, one group stands out as being at particular risk of having an inadequate 
income in retirement on the basis of both replacement rate and poverty-line 
benchmarks of adequacy: those who are not married or cohabitating in the years 
before retirement. Our estimates in Table 4.5 suggest that the odds of such 
individuals having income in retirement below 60 per cent of the national median 
are 1.4 times higher than for those who are married or cohabitating, while the 
chances they have income below the MESL is 30 times higher.22   
 
 
22 The odds ratio for the 50 per cent poverty line is less than 1 but is not statistically significant, reflecting the 
fact that only 2 per cent of our sample have incomes below this level.  
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TABLE 4.6  CORRELATION BETWEEN ADEQUACY BENCHMARKS (NARROW INCOME DEFINITION) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) RR <50% earnings 1.000      
(2) RR <67% income 0.331 1.000 
(3) RR <80% income 0.261 0.782 1.000    
(4) PL <60% median 0.131 0.239 0.182 1.000 
(5) PL <50% median 0.044 0.096 0.058 0.369 1.000  
(6) PL < MESL 0.245 0.282 0.222 0.519 0.291 1.000 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: RR stands for replacement rate; PL for poverty line and MESL for Minimum Essential Standard of Living.  
 
In general, the results suggest that different benchmarks give very different 
pictures of the extent and profile of income adequacy in retirement. This is perhaps 
best illustrated in Table 4.6, which displays the lack of correlation between the 
various benchmarks at an individual level. While to some extent this is driven by 
different rates of inadequacy across the benchmarks, that there is little correlation 
between the various benchmarks – especially between replacement rate and 
poverty line measures of adequacy – indicates that they are identifying different 
groups at risk of inadequacy in retirement. We conclude by considering the 
implications of these results for policy. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the likely adequacy of incomes in retirement for those 
approaching the SPA over the period 2022–2027. Taking a narrow definition of 
income, including just private, occupational and state pension payments, our 
results suggest that nearly a quarter of individuals born between 1955 and 1960 
will replace less than half their pre-retirement earnings in retirement – a 
benchmark to the forefront of government policy in recent decades. However, 
using the household disposable income benchmarks, far larger proportions of 
individuals (between 50 and 60 per cent using the narrow definition of income) are 
at risk of having an inadequate income in retirement. Measures of household 
disposable income (rather than individual earnings) are arguably more reflective of 
the resources available to an individual before retirement and thus of how 
adequately those approaching the SPA will be able to replicate those standards of 
living in retirement. 
Yet benchmarks based on having income below a certain threshold (so-called 
poverty-line measures) show that a much lower share of individuals are at risk of 
having inadequate income from private, occupational and state pensions: about a 
quarter of those born between 1955 and 1960. In addition, many of those that we 
simulate will fall just below the 60 per cent of median income poverty line in 
retirement will do so by only a small amount, suggesting relatively minor changes 
to the generosity of the state pension could have a large effect on the future 
headcount at-risk-of-poverty rate for pensioners.  
While this highlights how sensitive some of the commonly used benchmarks of 
income adequacy are to definitional differences, across all those we consider one 
group stands out as being at particular risk of having an inadequate income in 
retirement: those who are not married or cohabitating in the years before 
retirement. The Living Alone Increase could, therefore, be a particularly well-
targeted instrument for addressing concerns about income adequacy in retirement 
among those approaching the SPA. This is an additional payment made to 
recipients of both the contributory and non-contributory state pension (as well as 
certain other social welfare payments). It could provide a means of targeting 
increases in the state pension at those who appear, across all benchmarks, to be 
at greatest risk of having inadequate income in their retirement.    
Our results also show that private non-pension savings play an important role in 
individuals’ preparedness for retirement. Including the annuitised value of net-
financial assets and half the annuitised value of primary residences in our definition 
of income substantially reduces the proportion of people replacing a small share 
of their pre-retirement income. It also suggests that very few will have resources 
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available in retirement that place them below poverty-line measures of income 
adequacy, even the Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) calculated by the 
Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2019). 
Whether or not individuals should draw on wealth held in the form of primary 
residences to support living standards in retirement is a contentious and often 
emotive issue, not only in Ireland.23 Our inclusion of half the annuitised value of 
primary residences in our broadest measure of income is not a suggestion that 
individuals should downsize their home to one of half the value in retirement, but 
rather a way of reflecting the fact that a couple or single adult with housing wealth 
is – all else being equal – better off than one without.24 However, the extent to 
which future cohorts of retirees may be able to draw down owner-occupied 
housing wealth is likely to be more limited. Data from the most recent Census of 
Population indicates that the age at which two-thirds of the cohort own their own 
home (with or without a mortgage) has been increasing steadily over time (from 
28 years of age in 1991 to 41 in 2016),25 which implies substantial differences in 
the projected tenure and housing costs of younger cohorts. 
Less contentious is the idea that individuals should draw on their non-primary 
residence wealth in retirement. Much of this is accumulated precisely for such 
purposes, with evidence showing that these forms of savings make up an 
important source of expected income in retirement (Crawford, 2018). However, 
there is also evidence showing that individuals are reticent to draw on their non-
pension, non-primary residence wealth in retirement (ibid; Lockwood, 2018). 
Uncertainty over future health and long-term costs, as well as the desire to leave 
bequests to children, may partly explain this reticence. Data from TILDA show that 
90 per cent of over-50s households with adult children expect to leave a bequest 
to their children, and two-thirds expect to leave an inheritance of €150,000 or 
more (Nivakoski, 2019). Another factor that may contribute to this unwillingness is 
the design of capital taxes. Currently, assets transferred at death are fully exempt 
from Capital Gains Tax (CGT), which incentivises individuals to hold on to these 
assets rather than dispose of them in retirement.26 This discourages those who 
have bought an investment property, for example, from selling the asset and using 
the proceeds to achieve a higher level of living standards in retirement.  
 
23 See, for example, the discussion on pp.12-13 of Crawford and O’Dea (2012).  
24 Evidence on the extent to which retired individuals downsize their home is mixed. Banks et al. (2010) show 
that, while downsizing is common among those aged 50 and over in the United States, it is less so in England. 
Barrett and Kelly (2016) show there was very little evidence of downsizing among a similar-aged population in 
Ireland over the period 2010–2012, but this could also be explained by the dysfunctional nature of the property 
and residential mortgage market around this time.   
25 https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp1hii/cp1hii/tr/ 
26 While CAT applies to such bequests or gifts, it does so only above an exempt amount of €335,000 where the 
beneficiary is a child (including adopted child, stepchild and certain foster children) or minor child of a 
deceased child of the person disposing of the asset.  
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More generally, our findings suggest that policymakers need to interpret 
frequently used benchmarks of income adequacy with caution, particularly those 
that relate income in retirement to the amount of pre-retirement earnings or 
income they replace. Although such replacement rate measures of income 
adequacy have been to the forefront of government policy in recent decades, they 
impose quite a demanding benchmark given that the years preceding retirement 
are typically when earnings and income are highest. Indeed recent work has shown 
that, while almost 90 per cent of those born in England in the 1940s will replace 
less than 70 per cent of their pre-retirement earnings in retirement, only a third 
will replace less than this fraction of their average working-life earnings (Crawford 
and O’Dea, 2020). Replacement rates out of lifetime income may be a more 
relevant concept when considering the adequacy of income in retirement than that 
when earnings are at a lifetime peak.  
There is also perhaps a need for more explicit discussion about the inherent trade-
offs involved in meeting such benchmarks. Policy debates often consider more 
saving for retirement to be unambiguously a positive thing. In many cases it may 
well be. However, there is – all else being equal – a trade-off between living 
standards in retirement and in working life. For someone who has low levels of 
lifetime income, more saving for retirement comes at the expense of lower living 
standards during working life when needs might be high, particularly in the 
presence of children. While this trade-off can be relaxed by redistribution within 
or across cohorts, requiring individuals to save more for their retirement imposes 
costs during working life that should be taken account of in the formulation of 
pension policy.
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APPENDIX 1: TECHNICAL DETAILS OF SIMULATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix describes the data, methodology and key assumptions used to 
calculate retirement incomes for the cohort of individuals who are due to retire at 
the SPA between 2022 and 2027. Reflecting the range of benchmarks that can be 
used to assess retirement income adequacy, and the differing definitions of 
retirement income, we describe here how the information provided in wave 1 of 
TILDA is used to calculate a range of key variables. Section 2 outlines the general 
assumptions and methods underling the analysis, while Sections 3-5 provide more 
specific details on how the main income components are used to calculate our 
various benchmarks of adequacy. Section 3 focuses on pre-retirement income, 
which is necessary for calculating income replacement rates, while Section 4 
provides details on the calculation of pension income in retirement. Section 5 
describes the calculation of broader definitions of income, incorporating 
annuitised asset wealth and owner-occupied housing wealth.  
2. GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND MAIN ASSUMPTIONS 
We calculate predicted income and wealth for our cohort of interest at a household 
level. Our cohort includes all individuals interviewed in TILDA who were born 
between 1955 and 1960 who have not yet retired, and thus will reach the SPA 
somewhere between 2022 and 2027. Our unit of analysis is the individual, but our 
measures of income are primarily at a household level. Therefore, we calculate 
income for individuals in our cohort while accounting for their spouses or partners. 
In general, we assume that circumstances (e.g. marital status, employment) do not 
change between when the individuals are interviewed in the first wave of TILDA 
(2010) and the time they reach the SPA, at which point they retire. Our aim is to 
preserve the full sample of individuals covered by the TILDA survey, and therefore 
we use imputation methods to account for missing values in the data. 
Calculations of future disposable income and market income along with private 
and state pensions are made at an individual level, before being aggregated into a 
measure of household income. This household income is equivalised using 
modified OECD equivalence scales, to account for differences in household size. 
We generate three alternative definitions of household income in retirement. The 
first definition includes only income from pensions and spouses who may be 
working, the second includes the annuitised predicted future value of assets, and 
the third further includes half the annuitised future value of the primary residence.   
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TABLE A1.1 SUMMARY OF ASSUMED BEHAVIOUR 
 Assumption 
Retirement Those who report being retired in 2010 are assumed to be retired thereafter. 
All others retire in the year they reach the state pension age of 67.  
Lifetime All individuals are assumed to live until their cohort-sex life expectancy. 
Future employment Assume employment status remains constant until SPA. 
Future DC contributions  Assume individuals contribute a fixed proportion of their salary each month, 
equal to the portion contributed in the month of the survey. 
Liquidation of assets Assume individuals liquidate their pension at a fixed annuity rate equal to 4% 
(source: CBI press release). 
 
 
The goal of the analysis is to determine the adequacy of household disposable 
income. To do this, we use the TILDA dataset to predict household-level disposable 
income for each individual in the cohort of interest. Therefore, we must account 
not only for the personal income of those people in our cohort, but the income of 
the entire household. We define the household as the member of our cohort plus 
their spouse or partner. We assume there are no other members in the household. 
While the TILDA dataset includes information on dependents and other household 
members on the date of the survey in 2010, this information is likely to be largely 
irrelevant for family financial circumstance between 2022 and 2027, the years in 
which the people in our cohort reach the state pension age (SPA). We assume that 
individuals retire when they reach the SPA, and live until they reach their life 
expectancy, using sex and age-specific life expectancies from the CSO. We also 
assume that their status remains constant following the survey until their death, 
with the exception of retirement.  
The primary assumptions regarding past and future behaviour are summarised in 
Table A1.1, while assumptions made regarding past and future growth rates of 
economic variables are presented in Table A1.2.  
Where possible, we apply realised growth rates and rates of return in order to 
iterate forward wages and property values. To avoid the composition of asset 
holdings affecting predicted returns, we follow Crawford and O’Dea (2012) and 
apply a 2 per cent real rate of return to the holdings of all pension and non-housing 
assets.27 All amounts given in nominal terms are adjusted for inflation. We abstract 
from heterogeneity in growth rates across the distribution. For forecasts of 
returns, we abstract from heterogeneities across assets and assume that all assets 
receive the economy-wide risk-free rate of return. This assumption aligns with 
standard economic theory; returns in excess of this rate are rewards for bearing 
risk, and thus are not the focus of this analysis. We express all variables in terms of 
their 2021 value, using the risk-free rate of interest as our discount factor.  
 
27 The annualised return on 10-year government bonds is equal to about 2 per cent over this period. 
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TABLE A1.2 SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS OF GROWTH RATES OF ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Forecast values Assumption Source 
Future real return on assets 2% per annum Assumed value 
Future inflation 1.4% CBI forecast 
Future nominal wage/disposable 
income growth 
4.3% CBI forecast 
 
Past values Assumption Source 
Real return on non-housing assets 2% per annum Assumed value 
Appreciation of second home Growth in national Residential Property Price 
Index (RPPI) for all residential properties 
CSO 
Appreciation of primary residence Growth in RPPI for all residential properties for 
region where dwelling is located 
CSO 
Wages (nominal) Wages assumed to grow in line with average 
regular earnings 
CSO 
Disposable income (nominal) Grows in line with median equivalised disposable 
income 
CSO 
   
 
2.1 Missing value imputation 
A significant portion of responses have missing values. To carry out distributional 
analysis on the full sample of participants, we use imputation procedures to attach 
values to missing observations. We use these methods to preserve the full sample 
throughout the analysis. These procedures are designed to preserve the underlying 
distribution, with conditional hotdeck being the primary procedure used. This 
procedure involves assigning each missing value a randomly selected value from 
the set of known values, conditional on selected characteristics. That is, a random 
value is assigned to the missing observation from a group of known values with 
matching selected characteristics. In this way, the conditional distribution of 
observed values is preserved in the full dataset.  
The particular procedure employed for each variable is described below. The 
selection of characteristics (if any) to condition the random selection is done by 
considering the specifics of the variable in question. The first constraint involved is 
sample size. Each time the group is partitioned along a selected characteristic, the 
pool of known values from which random draws are made is also divided. 
Therefore, to gain a representative sample, the groups of known values from which 
our assigned values are drawn should be large relative to the number of missing 
values, where possible. The goal is to hotdeck from a group of realised values 
drawn from the same conditional distribution (based on the information we have) 
as the missing value being imputed.  
In the few cases where imputation is not possible due to lack of information – for 
example, when have no information about the kind of private pension an individual 
has – we do not hotdeck, but instead assume that the missing value takes zero. 
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This assumption allows us to preserve in the analysis the full sample of individuals 
in our cohort. State non-contributory pension is calculated for all individuals based 
on predicted income, meaning those with zero predicted income following 
imputation procedures will receive the full state non-contributory pension.  
3. CALCULATION OF INCOME 
 3.1 Income before retirement 
We use individuals’ reported household disposable income to define income 
before either spouse reaches the SPA. We assume that disposable income grows 
at the average rate of growth in real disposable income (reported by the CSO) for 
all people until 2018, the last year of observed data, and grows in line with 
predicted wage growth thereafter. If a person reports receiving an income from an 
existing pension at TILDA wave 1, we assume that they will receive this pension for 
the rest of their life. For households for which disposable income is missing, we 
hotdeck a value conditional on whether a member of the household is working, 
the number of people in their household and their region of residence. 
For people below the SPA, but who have a spouse who is retired, we assume that 
their income is given by the income they earn from employment. This seems a 
reasonable assumption as the Increase for a Qualified Adult (IQA) their spouse 
would receive should be more lucrative than any other state benefits available to 
them, and therefore they would not avail of other benefits, which would disqualify 
them from the IQA. We assume that people not in employment earn zero income 
from employment, and that income from employment grows at the observed or 
predicted rate of wage growth (see above). Missing values for pre-retirement 
earnings are hotdecked conditional on whether the individual is an employee or 
self-employed. For those who are self-employed as a farmer, we hotdeck values 
for the various sources of farm income (operating, state payments [REPS], etc) 
where missing, and aggregate these values. While disposable income accounts for 
the impact of taxes and transfers, this is not the case for earnings. Therefore, we 
apply both PRSI and income taxes to market earnings, by applying the stated rules 
of the present system. We assume that the parameters of the tax system grow at 
the same rate as average wages. 
A number of people in our cohort of interest were not in employment at the time 
of the survey, but their past salary is needed to calculate their future pension 
income. To impute monthly salaries for such individuals, we follow Crawford 
(2012), and use predicted values from a median regression of earnings on age, sex 
and education level, while accounting for non-linearities in the age profile of 
wages. This predicted salary level is then used, where necessary, to calculate 
private pension entitlements.  
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3.2 Income in retirement 
There are three primary sources of income in retirement: supplementary pensions, 
state contributory pensions, and state non-contributory pensions, along with the 
aforementioned pension income in receipt at the time of the survey. We use the 
information contained in the TILDA questionnaire to predict income streams from 
these three sources, applying various assumptions and imputing missing values 
where appropriate. 
Supplementary pensions 
There are two main types of supplementary pension: defined contribution (DC) and 
defined benefit (DB). We assume that annual payments from both pensions are 
uprated in line with wage growth in the years following retirement. Pension 
income is exempt from PRSI but is still subject to income tax and USC. We account 
for income tax on all pension income according to the standard rules. Income tax 
is charged at a household level, so market and pension income of spouses is 
included in this calculation, where appropriate. 
Defined contribution pensions 
Defined contribution (DC) pensions are essentially a savings account that 
accumulates with personal contributions and returns on assets until the date of 
retirement, when the holder may purchase an annuity payment from an insurance 
provider. To calculate defined contribution pensions, we start with the size of each 
person’s fund in 2010, and assume they contribute a fixed portion of their salary 
to this fund each month. We assume that funds grow at the risk-free real interest 
rate, abstracting from excess returns. We also assume that contributions occur 
each month, and interest accrues monthly. This process generates a predicted 
value of pension fund size at the year of retirement.  
We assume that all persons annuitise their pension at a rate of 4 per cent; that is, 
they sell their fund in exchange for a payment that is equivalent to 4 per cent of 
the value of their fund annually. Although comprehensive data on annuity rates is 
not available for Ireland, an inspection by the Central Bank in 2016 suggested that 
these ranged between 3.8 and 4.5 per cent for a single non-smoking man born in 
1950. We test the sensitivity of our results to annuity rates of 3 and 5 per cent, and 
find that they make no qualitative difference to our main results.  
Since calculating the value of a DC scheme involves tracking both a stock and a 
flow, the imputation procedure we use is more complicated. This procedure is used 
for individuals who report having a DC pension, but do not report an aspect of it 
(e.g. value, monthly contribution). To establish the value of the fund at the time of 
the survey, we hotdeck a value conditional on the type of DC pension 
(occupational, PRSA, etc). For individuals who do not know the type of DC pension 
they have, we do not impute and instead assume a contribution rate of zero. 
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To impute the value of annual contributions to DC funds, we hotdeck a contribution 
rate as a portion of monthly salary, again conditional on the type of pension 
scheme. We then use this assigned contribution rate and the individual’s (possibly 
imputed) monthly salary to obtain their monthly contribution to DC pensions, 
which we can use to predict their value at the point of retirement. We cap the total 
contributions made to DC pensions at 40 per cent of their salary, as this is the age-
specific limit of tax exemption allowed by the government immediately before 
retirement. 
Defined benefit pensions 
Defined benefit (DB) schemes provide members with a fixed payment on 
retirement, equal to some proportion of salary or nominal amount. In terms of 
contributions, respondents report a monthly payment as a portion of salary or in 
nominal terms. For those who report a nominal amount, we can directly use this 
value as the monthly payment they will receive on retirement. For those who 
report a percentage of salary, we assume that this is calculated as a percentage of 
salary in the year before retirement. For those with a DB scheme who do not report 
their future monthly payment, we hotdeck a portion of their salary that they will 
receive from the full sample of DB payments (including those who report a nominal 
amount). We then multiply this rate by their (possibly imputed) final salary.  
DB schemes are often accompanied by a lump-sum payment received at the point 
of retirement. For those who report they will receive a lump sum but do not know 
its amount, we hotdeck a value from the set of known values, including both public 
and private schemes. A lump sum becomes a stock of cash assets upon its receipt, 
and therefore we treat it in exactly this manner in calculating pension income. We 
assume that householders annuitise the value of their lump sum in a similar way 
to how they annuitise DC funds (described above).  
State contributory pensions 
An individual’s entitlement to the contributory state pension in Ireland is based on 
their history of PRSI or social insurance contributions. The rate of pension received 
is dependent only on the number of contributions, rather than the value of 
contributions paid.  
Until 2018, contributory state pension entitlements were based on the average 
number of weekly PRSI contributions made by individuals between the time they 
first entered employment and the time they reached the SPA. Conditional on 
making contributions before age 56 and having made 520 (10 years’) contributions, 
someone with an average of more than 48 contributions per year was entitled to 
receive the maximum rate of the contributory state pension. This meant that 
someone who entered work aged 18, for example, but took time out of the 
workforce to care for children or parents could end up with a lower entitlement 
than someone who moved to the country aged 56 and worked for 10 years. 
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TABLE A1.3 SIMULATED STATE CONTRIBUTORY PENSION ENTITLEMENTS UNDER DIFFERENT 
SCHEMES (IN 2019) FOR TILDA COHORT 
Rate in 2019 Interim TCA Old scheme TCA 40-year 
>=€243.40 74.3% 67.2% 68.2% 
€223.30 – €243.40 12.1% 15.3% 7.8% 
€211.40 – €223.30   4.7% 6.1% 2.5% 
€161.80 – €211.40  3.7% 1.1% 12.4% 
€99.20 – €161.80 1.8% 0.3% 4.8% 
0 – €99.20  2.5% 6.1% 1.1% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Table shows simulated pension entitlement (in 2019 terms) that we simulate our sample will be entitled to under 
the current interim Total Contributions Approach scheme, the historic scheme, and a Total Contributions Approach 
scheme if assessed with 40 years required to obtain a full pension. 
 
 
This prompted the Government to propose a change to the pension system 
whereby entitlements would instead be calculated based on the total number of 
years a person has been paying PRSI contributions, plus years for which credits 
were awarded for carrying out caring duties (Government of Ireland, 2018). This 
Total Contributions Approach (TCA) was due to come into force for all those 
retiring from late 2020, but full details have yet to be announced, and its 
introduction appears to have been postponed to 2021.28 Those retiring are instead 
currently assessed on the basis of both the pre-2018 and an ‘interim’ TCA system, 
and awarded the larger of the two amounts.29  
We follow this approach in our simulation of individuals’ contributory state 
pension entitlements, using the information on employment history collected in 
the first wave of TILDA. This consists of the year in which the individual started 
working and the number of years spent in employment. We assume that 
individuals paid the maximum number of contributions in the years they were in 
work (52), and that their employment status remains unchanged between wave 1 
(2010) of the survey and the time they reach the SPA of 67 (between 2022 and 
2027).  
Individuals can also obtain PRSI credits for time spent caring for children under 12, 
older family members and for the first year of a spell of unemployment. Since 1994, 
these have been available to parents caring for children under the age of 12. From 
the information provided in the survey we can determine the years for which each 
individual had a child who was aged under 12 since 1994. For two-adult 
households, such credits can only be given to one member who has taken time 




29 For full details of the way in which contributory state pension entitlements are assessed, see 
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/older_and_retired_people/st
ate_pension_contributory.html 
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least number of years worked is the carer. In situations where both partners have 
worked the same number of years, we assume that the female spouse is entitled 
to the credits.30 We also assume that parents who have taken time out of work did 
so when their children were aged under 12; that is, when such time off would have 
accrued entitlements to credits. Years spent receiving credits are added to years 
spent in work in order to calculate pension entitlements, along with one year of 
contributions for those who report a spell of unemployment.   
State non-contributory pensions 
Individuals are also potentially eligible to receive a means-tested non-contributory 
pension. We calculate entitlement to this on the basis of simulated household 
income and asset holdings in retirement, using the methods described in Section 4 
below. Household income is the sum of income from other pensions (state 
contributory and supplementary) and any earnings from younger spouses or 
partners still in work. We assume that the parameters governing the calculation of 
means from assets increase at a rate equal to the real interest rate, while all other 
parameters of the means test and resultant payments grow in line with wages.31   
4. ESTIMATING ASSETS AND PENSION WEALTH 
To reduce household response burden in TILDA, wealth information is collected 
from only one respondent in each household, the nominated financial respondent. 
We use the information provided by this financial respondent to generate 
household-level holdings of wealth and assets. Financial respondents provide point 
estimates of the value of their assets and outstanding non-mortgage debt. We 
consider four categories of assets outside of the primary residence: deposits, 
financial assets, non-primary residences, and other assets. The last category 
includes land, art, jewellery and business holdings and inheritances. TILDA also 
includes information on car ownership, though we do not include these or other 
fast-depreciating consumer durables in our measure of household wealth.  
Homeowners also provide a point estimate of the value of their primary residence, 
which we use to determine the value of the primary residence at the time of the 
survey. Those who refused or claimed not to know the relevant amount in relation 
to a wealth question were asked a follow-up question which gave the option of 
providing a banded answer rather than a point estimate. We use the mid-points of 
these bands as the values for those who did not answer the original questions. For 
the remaining missing values, we hotdeck a value of the home, conditional on the 
range of values. Where homeowners do not provide a banded value, we hotdeck 
 
30 Given that both spouses have equal entitlements, allocating the credits to male or female members has no 
impact on lifetime household income, but may affect the timing. For example, if spouses retire in different 
periods, the higher income will be experienced when the female is in retirement according to our assumption.  
31 See https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/66ac9a-operational-guidelines-state-pension-non-contributory/ for 
full details on how entitlement to the non-contributory state pension is assessed.  
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a value from the full set of houses, conditional on the value being greater than 
€10,000, in order to disregard implausibly low values. A similar method is used for 
the financial assets and other property categories of assets. For deposits, debt and 
non-primary residences, we unconditionally hotdeck a point estimate of the value 
of assets.  
We assume that the primary residence appreciates in line with the Residential 
Property Price Index (RPPI) for residences in Dublin or outside Dublin, depending 
on the location of the home. We also disregard mortgage debt, assuming it will be 
repaid by the time the state pension age is reached. We assume that secondary 
residences appreciate in line with the CSO’s RPPI for all dwellings. We assume that 
all other assets and debt earns a real interest rate of 2% per annum, while further 
saving (outside of private pension) or repayment of non-mortgage debt does not 
occur. This is equivalent to calculating individuals’ net position (assets less 
liabilities) excluding secondary residences, and assuming this grows at 2 per cent 
per year, the method used by Crawford (2012) in a similar study carried out in the 
UK. 
5. INCOME FROM NET-FINANCIAL ASSETS 
Our broader definitions of income include income derived from drawing down 
asset holdings in retirement. We assume that this process takes place in an 
identical manner to DC pension funds; that is, the value of assets is annuitised at a 
constant rate. However, we assume that income from these sources increases in 
line with asset values, and thus remains constant in present value terms. 
Moreover, such payments are not subject to income tax or USC. Since we have no 
information on the price at which assets were acquired, we cannot apply capital 
gains tax and thus treat income from assets as exempt from tax.  







TABLE A2.1  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF REPLACEMENT RATE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
(INCLUDING ANNUITISED VALUE OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <50% earnings <67% income <80% income 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 1.084 0.721* 
 
0.796 
Rural area 0.621* 0.648** 0.732* 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 0.252* 0.339*** 0.268*** 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 13.902*** 6.993*** 5.676*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 0.594** 0.736** 0.654*** 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 1.998 1.495* 1.538* 
Upper secondary 3.442** 1.753** 1.533* 
Post-secondary < degree 3.056** 1.691** 1.547* 
Post-secondary degree or higher 8.695*** 2.256*** 2.119*** 
    
Observations 1904 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions, interpreted as the likelihood that someone with observed 
characteristic has equivalised disposable income below the benchmark cut-off compared to the reference category. 
Stars show statistical significance, indicating a p value of < 0.05 (*),< 0.01(**) and < 0.001 (***) respectively. 
Replacement rates are calculated at an individual level comparing equivalised household disposable income in 
retirement (including annuitised value of financial assets) to equivalised household earnings before retirement, 
excluding 512 individuals without any earnings (column 1) and equivalised disposable income before retirement 
(columns 2 and 3). 
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TABLE A2.2  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF REPLACEMENT RATE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
(INCLUDING ANNUITISED VALUE OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS PLUS HALF PRIMARY 
RESIDENCE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: <50% earnings <67% income <80% income 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 1.229 0.794 0.859 
Rural area 0.883 0.785 0.817 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 0.386 0.310*** 0.261*** 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 10.466*** 4.973*** 4.354*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 0.620* 0.680*** 0.629*** 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 1.751 1.275 1.378 
Upper secondary 3.502* 1.230 1.339 
Post-secondary < degree 3.703** 1.373 1.396 
Post-secondary degree or higher 8.867*** 1.716** 1.759** 
    
Observations 1904 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions, interpreted as the likelihood that someone with observed 
characteristic has equivalised disposable income below the benchmark cut-off compared to the reference category. 
Stars show statistical significance, indicating a p value of < 0.05 (*),< 0.01(**) and < 0.001 (***) respectively. 
Replacement rates are calculated at an individual level comparing equivalised household disposable income in 
retirement (including annuitised value of net financial assets and half annuitised value of primary residence) to 
equivalised household earnings before retirement, excluding 512 individuals without any earnings (column 1) and 








TABLE A2.3  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF POVERTY-LINE RATE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
(INCLUDING ANNUITISED VALUE OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: < 60% median < 50% median < MESL 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 0.954 0.555 0.672 
Rural area 1.005 1.251 28.603*** 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 0.502 0.234 0.437* 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 0.891 0.544* 32.676*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 1.531* 2.591** 2.038*** 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 0.779 0.603 0.782 
Upper secondary 0.595* 0.463 0.652 
Post-secondary < degree 0.438** 0.663 0.471** 
Post-secondary degree or higher 0.287*** 0.165** 0.303*** 
    
Observations 1904 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions, interpreted as the likelihood that someone with observed 
characteristic has equivalised disposable income below the benchmark cut-off compared to the reference category. 
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TABLE A2.4  LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF POVERTY-LINE INCOME ADEQUACY BENCHMARK 
(INCLUDING ANNUITISED VALUE OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS PLUS HALF VALUE OF 
PRIMARY RESIDENCE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Share with income in retirement that is: < 60% median < 50% median < MESL 
    
Living in     
Dublin (reference)    
Urban area outside Dublin 0.948 0.669 0.698 
Rural area 1.182 1.333 8.562*** 
    
Household type    
Non-farming household (reference)    
Farming household 0.656 0.323 0.587 
    
Cohabitation status in working life    
Married/cohabitating (reference)    
Single 0.654* 0.495* 6.902*** 
    
Gender    
Man (reference)    
Woman 1.477 2.232* 1.435 
    
Education    
Primary or lower (reference)    
Lower secondary 0.623 0.725 0.727 
Upper secondary 0.425** 0.374 0.431** 
Post-secondary < degree 0.382** 0.804 0.525* 
Post-secondary degree or higher 0.186*** 0.083* 0.202*** 
    
Observations 1904 1904 1904 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing (TILDA).  
Note: Coefficients show odd-ratios from logistic regressions, interpreted as the likelihood that someone with observed 
characteristic has equivalised disposable income below the benchmark cut-off compared to the reference category. 
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